{"id":1668,"date":"2008-09-03T14:51:00","date_gmt":"2008-09-03T14:51:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/perkumpulanidea.org\/?p=1668"},"modified":"2024-10-13T16:29:15","modified_gmt":"2024-10-13T16:29:15","slug":"dalam-krisis-siapa-mendukung-siapa","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/perkumpulanidea.org\/en\/2008\/09\/03\/dalam-krisis-siapa-mendukung-siapa\/","title":{"rendered":"In a Crisis, Who Supports Whom?"},"content":{"rendered":"<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">In Jakarta some time ago, I had a heated debate with a World Bank&nbsp;<em>lead economist.<\/em>&nbsp;We had different opinions about who should actually pay for the cost of economic recovery, after the rupiah plunged in the international money market and then spread to the monetary sector and the real sector. This debate started from several simple questions that \u2013 to my knowledge \u2013 always arise from the economic recovery scenarios advocated by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The questions were; doesn't the government bear the risk of saving the private sector by taking over collapsed banks? Isn't the private sector also the one who will profit when the bankrupt banks have been recapitalized and then privatized again?<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">In simple terms, the economist explained one of the reasons that prompted the government to take over private banks that were in default. With the illustration of a bank's balance sheet, according to him, the government ensures that all depositors can get their money back because the government injects&nbsp;<em>bail out funds<\/em>&nbsp;on the liabilities side of banks experiencing a liquidity crisis. That is why, some time ago, banners were displayed in front of bank offices explaining that public funds are safe because they are guaranteed by the government. That is also what caused the brochures of a number of banks that were previously privately owned to now be marked; Government Owned.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">It makes sense. In fact, the economist said that the government is willing to bear an additional domestic debt burden of US$ 85.7 billion for bank recapitalization that is based on the public's interest in their funds deposited in banks. This additional burden will ultimately burden the state budget (APBN) and reduce the government's ability to fund its activities and investment to stimulate economic recovery and - this is the most important - the provision of&nbsp;<em>public goods<\/em>&nbsp;and&nbsp;<em>social services<\/em>&nbsp;in the form of&nbsp;<em>education<\/em>&nbsp;and&nbsp;<em>healthcare<\/em>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>Who is the Community?<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Here the question arises; who exactly are the people or the people referred to in the heroic story of saving the bankrupt banks? From the economist's perspective, the people are the owners of deposits and savings in the banks. An easy-to-understand answer. Then, who exactly are the people in the context of the government's declining ability to finance social services? Unfortunately, we did not have time to debate this question. And the answer is; one class in the structure of Indonesian society that is easily identified as&nbsp;<em>vulnerable people, less developed people, or poor people<\/em>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">These two answers do not point in the same direction, although they may overlap. Some poor people may have savings in banks. However, it is not debatable that some of the owners of large deposits in these banks are not poor. They are the rich or perhaps very rich. They may also be giant debtors who help drain bank liquidity. This is another society that exists in the economist's perspective but is never mentioned.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">This layer of bank liquidity drain, more or less benefited from the banking rescue efforts carried out by the government through the National Bank Restructuring Agency (BPPN). The logic is simple. By taking over the dilapidated banks, the government through BPPN temporarily took over the obligations of the giant debtors who were in trouble so that depositors' funds could still be withdrawn. The intention was, the stubborn debtors would be pursued later. However, until now it is clearly visible how difficult it is to get these big debtors to fulfill their obligations to pay their debts.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Even though BPPN has taken various steps \u2013 including ultimatums and slightly embarrassing the stubborn debtors by announcing their categories and names \u2013 the money that was stolen is not easily returned. And legal handling for them is also faltering. So, it seems really nice to be a bad debtor in this country as long as there is a government and BPPN that wants to save the banks.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Returning to the so-called poor society, statistical data shows that the number of those living below the poverty line has exploded from 23 million people (11 percent of the total population) in 1996 to double, 50 million people (24 percent of the population) in 1998. This means that, as the report of the&nbsp;<em>Japan International Cooperations Agency (JICA)<\/em>&nbsp;seminar on Indonesia's economic recovery in Tokyo some time ago noted, Indonesia needs 5-10 years to return to the pre-crisis situation. The reason is, with an average economic growth of 6.2 percent per year, Indonesia needs 12 years (1983-1995) to reduce the population to only 13 percent. This situation means that the problem of the poor cannot be treated as a short-term problem but must be considered as a medium-term or even long-term problem.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">This sharp increase in the number of poor people feels very contrasting when we find many misappropriations of the social safety net (JPS) program or more substantially, namely the reduction in the social budget in the APBN which has shrunk by more than half over the past three years. In fact, the government's budget to support them should be directly proportional to the number of poor people. That what happened was the opposite, the government's reasons for that felt classic and repetitive; the country was being hit by misfortune so everyone had to tighten their belts. It is important to note, that is also what the World Bank and the IMF recommend with the keyword&nbsp;<em>sound economic management.<\/em>So, it is not surprising that the government then cut all forms of subsidies, from fertilizer to fuel oil.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Even if belt tightening and all forms of&nbsp;<em>austerity<\/em>&nbsp;are part of what is meant by sound economic management, where can we find consistency at the level of policy implementation? It is indeed rather difficult to find where the consistency of government policy is. On the one hand, the government cuts all forms of subsidies but on the other hand, increases the salaries of its high-ranking employees, thus creating a gap as well as jealousy among low-ranking government employees.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">On the other hand, the government still allows the salaries&nbsp;<em>of top management<\/em>&nbsp;of state-owned enterprises (BUMN) to be so large plus various luxurious facilities. Once the government declared its intention to restore conditions and reduce the burden on the economy. But at the same time the government continues to collect debts from abroad and domestically without calculating the risks and its capacity to repay. Once the government intended to eradicate corruption but not a single case was resolved satisfactorily.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">With that inconsistency, it seems true that savings only apply to the poor, who in this time of crisis are actually unable to save any more. The problem is, for what and who should the poor save and give up their rights to receive government services not being fulfilled?<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>Model Protective Shells<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Surrounded by a prolonged crisis, the government and political elites are basically under threat of a legitimacy crisis. This is a direct consequence of their claims on state institutions that are not fully supported by society. However, according to the earliest model of state-civil society relations, political elites&nbsp;<em>at all costs<\/em>&nbsp;continue to try to dominate society, through the state.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Thanks to their control over state apparatus, while civil society's access to the instrument is very limited, political elites have the freedom to position themselves, as well as the weak position of civil society. With some assumptions, the issue of legitimacy of political elites will be easily overcome because they can play the relationship between the state and civil society in a crisis situation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">In the&nbsp;<em>protective shells model<\/em>, the state becomes the outer shield of civil society against any pressure. However, this model assumes a state built from societal consensus, with some variations in both the East and the West.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">However, for a country that is built on the claims of political elites like Indonesia, it is actually civil society that is the country's protective jacket that is instrumentally exploited by political elites for their own interests.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">For the case of savings in economic recovery efforts, it is true that civil society, especially the poor who have not been empowered, become the protectors of the existence of the state that is being ridden by the interests of the political elite. Even sadder, the political elite has never made a serious effort to maintain the resilience of its protective jacket, but rather the 'fat lice' on its body that also take advantage of the sacrifices of the poor. It seems that the distance from the situation of the state and civil society overlapping, or at least the equality of civil society and&nbsp;<em>political society<\/em>&nbsp;in the identity of the state is still very far.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Wahyu W. Basjir, direktur Institute for Development and Economic Analysis (IDEA)<\/p>","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Di Jakarta beberapa waktu lalu, saya sempat berdebat sengit dengan seorang&nbsp;lead economist&nbsp;Bank Dunia. Kami berbeda pendapat perihal siapa sebenarnya yang mesti membayar biaya pemulihan ekonomi, setelah anjloknya rupiah di pasar uang internasional kemudian merembet ke sektor moneter dan sektor riil. Perdebatan ini dimulai dari beberapa pertanyaan sederhana yang \u2013sepengetahuan saya\u2014selalu muncul dari skenario pemulihan ekonomi yang advocated oleh Bank Dunia maupun Dana Moneter Internasional (IMF). Pertanyaan itu adalah; bukankah pemerintah mengemban risiko penyelamatan sektor swasta dengan mengambil alih bank-bank yang collapse? Bukankah sektor swasta juga yang akan mengambil untung ketika bank-bank bobrok itu sudah direkapitalisasi dan kemudian diswastakan kembali? Secara sederhana, sang ekonom menjelaskan salah satu sebab yang mendorong pemerintah melakukan take over atas bank-bank swasta yang mengalami default. Dengan ilustrasi neraca sebuah bank, menurutnya, pemerintah memastikan seluruh deposan bisa mendapatkan kembali uangnya karena pemerintah menyuntikkan dana talangan&nbsp;(bail out fund)&nbsp;di sisi kewajiban bank yang mengalami krisis likuiditas. Itulah sebabnya, beberapa waktu lalu terpampang spanduk-spanduk di depan kantor-kantor bank yang menerangkan bahwa dana masyarakat aman karena dijamin pemerintah. Itu juga yang menyebabkan brosur sejumlah bank yang dulunya milik swasta kini dibubuhi catatan; Milik Pemerintah. Masuk akal. Bahkan, ekonom tersebut mengatakan bahwa pemerintah berani menanggung tambahan beban utang domestik sebesar US$ 85,7 miliar untuk rekapitalisasi perbankan yang bermuara pada kepentingan masyarakat atas dananya yang disimpan di bank. Tambahan beban itu, memang pada akhirnya membebani anggaran negara (APBN) sehingga mengurangi kemampuan pemerintah mendanai aktivitasnya maupun penanaman modal untuk merangsang pemulihan ekonomi maupun \u2013ini yang terpenting\u2014penyediaan&nbsp;public goods&nbsp;dan layanan sosial&nbsp;(social service)&nbsp;berupa pendidikan&nbsp;(education)&nbsp;dan kesehatan&nbsp;(healthcare). Siapakah Masyarakat? Sampai di sini muncul pertanyaan; siapakah sebenarnya yang disebut masyarakat atau rakyat dalam kisah heroik penyelamatan bank-bank bobrok itu? Dalam perspektif sang ekonom, rakyat adalah para pemilik deposito dan tabungan di bank-bank itu. Jawaban yang mudah dimengerti. Lalu, siapakah sebenarnya masyarakat dalam konteks menurunnya kemampuan pemerintah dalam membelanjai layanan sosial? Sayangnya, pertanyaan ini tidak sempat kami perdebatkan. Dan jawabannya adalah; satu kelas dalam struktur masyarakat Indonesia yang secara mudah diidentifikasi sebagai&nbsp;vulnerable people, less developed people atau poor people. Dua jawaban tersebut tidak menunjuk arah yang sama kendatipun keduanya mungkin beririsan. Sebagian masyarakat miskin, mungkin memiliki simpanan di bank. Namun, tidak perlu diperdebatkan bahwa sebagian pemilik simpanan berjumlah besar di bank-bank itu bukanlah kaum miskin. Mereka adalah lapisan masyarakat kaya atau mungkin sangat kaya. Mereka mungkin sekaligus juga debitur raksasa yang ikut menguras likuiditas bank. Ini masyarakat lain yang ada dalam perspektif sang ekonom namun tidak pernah disebut. Lapisan penguras likuiditas bank ini, sedikit banyak diuntungkan oleh upaya penyelamatan perbankan yang dilakukan pemerintah melalui Badan Penyehatan Perbankan Nasional (BPPN). Nalarnya sederhana saja. Dengan mengambil alih bank-bank bobrok, pemerintah melalui BPPN sementara mengambil alih kewajiban debitur raksasa yang macet itu agar dana deposan tetap bisa ditarik. Maunya sih, debitur bandel itu akan dikejar kemudian. Tapi, sampai sekarang terlihat nyata betapa sulitnya menarik debitur-debitur besar itu untuk menunaikan kewajibannya membayar utang. Sekalipun BPPN sudah melakukan berbagai langkah \u2013termasuk ultimatum dan sedikit mempermalukan para debitur bandel dengan mengumumkan kategori dan nama-nama mereka\u2014toh uang yang kepalang bobol tak mudah kembali. Dan penanganan hukum untuk mereka juga tersendat-sendat. Jadinya, terkesan sungguh enak menjadi debitur macet di negeri ini selama masih ada pemerintah dan BPPN yang mau menyelamatkan bank-bank itu. Kembali ke masyarakat yang disebut miskin tadi, data statistik menyebutkan jumlah mereka \u2013yang hidup di bawah garis kemiskinan\u2014meledak dari 23 juta jiwa (11persen dari total populasi penduduk) pada tahun 1996 menjadi dua kali lipat, 50 juta jiwa (24 persen dari populasi penduduk) pada tahun 1998. Artinya, seperti laporan seminar&nbsp;Japan International Cooperations Agency (JICA)&nbsp;tentang pemulihan ekonomi Indonesia di Tokyo beberapa waktu lalu mancatat, Indonesia memerlukan waktu 5-10 tahun untuk kembali ke situasi sebelum krisis. Alasannya, dengan rata-rata pertumbuhan ekonomi 6,2 persen per tahun, Indonesia membutuhkan waktu 12 tahun (1983-1995) untuk mengurangi jumlah penduduk menjadi hanya 13 persen. Situasi ini menyebabkan masalah penduduk miskin tidak bisa diperlakukan sebagai problem jangka pendek melainkan harus dianggap sebagai problem jangka menengah atau bahkan jangka panjang. Kenaikan tajam jumlah penduduk miskin ini terasa sangat kontras ketika kita menemukan banyaknya penyelewengan program jaring pengaman sosial (JPS) maupun yang lebih substansial yakni penurunan anggaran sosial dalam APBN yang selama tiga tahun terakhir telah menyusut lebih dari separuh. Padahal, anggaran pemerintah untuk menyantuni mereka mestinya berbanding lurus dengan jumlah penduduk miskin. Bahwa yang terjadi adalah sebaliknya, alasan pemerintah untuk itu terasa klasik dan repetitif; negara sedang dirundung malang sehingga semua harus mengetatkan ikat pinggang. Penting dicatat, itu juga yang direkomendasikan Bank Dunia maupun IMF dengan kata kunci&nbsp;sound economic management. Maka, tak mengherankan jika pemerintahpun kemudian memotong segala bentuk subsidi, dari pupuk sampai bahan bakar minyak. Kalaupun pengetatan ikat pinggang dan segala bentuk penghematan&nbsp;(austerity)&nbsp;itu adalah bagian dari yang dimaksud sound economic management, di manakah kita bisa menemukan konsistensi pada tingkat implementasi kebijakan? Memang agak sulit untuk menemukan di mana konsistensi kebijakan pemerintah itu. Di satu sisi pemerintah memotong segala bentuk subsidi namun di sisi lain menaikkan gaji pegawai tingginya sehingga menciptakan kesenjangan sekaligus kecemburuan di kalangan pegawai pemerintah rendahan. Di sisi yang lain, pemerintah masih membiarkan gaji&nbsp;top management&nbsp;perusahaan negara (BUMN) begitu besar ditambah berbagai fasilitas yang wah. Suatu ketika pemerintah menyatakan iktikadnya memulihkan kondisi dan mengurangi beban perekonomian. Namun pada saat yang sama pemerintah terus-terusan menjaring utang dari luar negeri maupun domestik tanpa berhitung risiko dan kapasitasnya membayar kembali. Pernah pemerintah berniat membasmi koruptor namun tidak ada satu kasuspun yang selesai dengan memuaskan. Dengan inkonsistensi itu, tampak benar bahwa penghematan hanya berlaku bagi masyarakat miskin, yang dalam masa krisis ini sebenarnya tidak mungkin lebih berhemat lagi. Masalahnya, untuk apa dan siapa masyarakat miskin mesti berhemat dan merelakan hak-haknya mendapatkan pelayanan pemerintah tidak terpenuhi? Model Protective Shells Dilingkupi krisis berkepanjangan, pemerintah dan elit politik pada dasarnya ada di bawah ancaman krisis legitimasi. Ini konsekuensi langsung dari klaim mereka atas institusi negara yang tidak sepenuhnya didukung oleh masyarakat. Namun, sesuai model paling awal hubungan negara-masyarakat sipil, elit politik&nbsp;at all cost&nbsp;tetap berusaha melakukan dominasi atas masyarakat, melalui negara. Berkat penguasaan atas perangkat-perangkat negara, sementara akses masyarakat sipil terhadap instrumen itu sangat terbatas, elit politik memiliki keleluasaan untuk mendudukkan posisinya, sekaligus posisi masyarakat sipil yang lembek. Dengan beberapa asumsi, persoalan<\/p>","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":1669,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"elementor_theme","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[65],"tags":[127,128,106],"class_list":["post-1668","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-artikel","tag-audit","tag-keterbukaan","tag-partisipasi"],"amp_enabled":false,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/perkumpulanidea.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1668","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/perkumpulanidea.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/perkumpulanidea.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/perkumpulanidea.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/perkumpulanidea.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=1668"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/perkumpulanidea.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1668\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":1670,"href":"https:\/\/perkumpulanidea.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1668\/revisions\/1670"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/perkumpulanidea.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/1669"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/perkumpulanidea.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=1668"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/perkumpulanidea.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=1668"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/perkumpulanidea.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=1668"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}