{"id":2720,"date":"2024-11-25T04:47:36","date_gmt":"2024-11-25T04:47:36","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/perkumpulanidea.org\/?p=2720"},"modified":"2024-11-25T05:36:58","modified_gmt":"2024-11-25T05:36:58","slug":"money-politics-in-elections-in-indonesia","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/perkumpulanidea.org\/en\/2024\/11\/25\/money-politics-in-elections-in-indonesia\/","title":{"rendered":"Money Politics in Elections in Indonesia"},"content":{"rendered":"

Politik uang <\/em>embodies a political practice that chips away from the integrity of democracy. While it is present in numerous political systems, it is particularly notable in Indonesian politics, at every level. According to a Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi<\/em> (KPK) survey from March 2014, 78.2 percent of voters consider politik uang <\/em>to be lazim<\/em>, \u201ccommon\u201d (Politik Uang di Indonesia<\/em>, Bab 20). Considering politik uang<\/em> is illegal, this is certainly cause for concern. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

The most well-known form of politik uang<\/em> in Indonesia is vote buying, where candidates directly bribe voters prior to elections. Given that vote buying is illegal, it is particularly difficult to collect data on specific methods of vote buying instances. It is evident, however, that the most upfront cases of vote buying often occur during the final days leading up to the election. For general elections in Indonesia, there is a three-day period between the end of the campaigning period and election day, a time known as Masa Tenang<\/em>, the \u201cQuiet Period.\u201d This was originally established in hopes of maintaining a fair and honest democratic election, though ironically, it is instead one of the most exploited times for politik uang<\/em> to occur. These vote buying transactions between candidates\/their campaign teams and voters can take the form of envelopes of cash, everyday necessities, and even services and other economic benefits, ultimately with the expectation that the beneficiaries\u2019 votes will be given to the candidates in return. These instances of direct bribery are known as serangan fajar<\/em>, or \u201cdawn attacks,\u201d for they frequently occur in the middle of the night to avoid detection by police. During the Quiet Period prior to the 2020 election, for example, there were 25 reported cases of politik uang<\/em> across 25 distinct districts and cities in Indonesia (Bawaslu<\/a>). Although there are consistently cases of illegal vote buying caught by the police, it can be assumed that many cases go unnoticed. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

There is a significantly more effective, though much more risky, method of politik uang <\/em>that frequently occurs during elections, a method known as dagang suara <\/em>— \u201cvote trading.\u201d While vote buying involves candidates and voters, vote trading involves candidates and election organizers. Vote trading essentially cuts out the role of voters in democratic elections, and allows candidates to buy their seats directly from other candidates, election organizers, and even the Komisi Pemilihan Umum Republik Indonesia<\/em> (KPU), the General Elections Commission of Indonesia. Since the introduction of the open-list proportional election system in 2009, vote trading has increased drastically, as candidates within the same parties are systematically pinned against one another. The existence of vote trading highlights the need for organizations like the KPU, KPPS (Kelompok Pelaksana Pemungutan Suara<\/em> — voting implementation group), and PPS (Panitia Pemungutan Suara<\/em> — voting committee) to maintain the integrity of elections and those organizing them. However, when the perpetrators are members of these organizations, it is difficult to actually prosecute them due to lack of solid evidence. Election supervisors from different parties are strategic positions to safeguard elections from these violations, but they are also the most vulnerable to corruption. Trends show lower levels of elections, such as district levels, tend to have more cases of vote trading, as election organizers at these levels are not paid as much, and therefore more likely to accept bribes. Vote trading at higher levels is much riskier, and therefore less common, but vote trading at all levels is illegal (Politik Uang di Indonesia<\/em>, Bab 20).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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To find creative ways to evade the laws forbidding politik uang<\/em>, in major cities like Jakarta, a more \u201csubtle\u201d kind of politik uang<\/em> has engraved itself into the political status quo: patronage. Considered to be perekat politik<\/em> — \u201cpolitical glue\u201d — of campaigning strategies in Indonesia (as well as many other democracies), patronage is considered to exist within a gray area of money politics. Candidates often use patronage as a way to get their names out in the communities, and connect with voters through a rather pragmatic process. Patronage can reveal itself as candidates providing access to club goods, assistance with navigating government machinery, and other \u201cfree\u201d services, with the expectation that their beneficiaries will pay at the polls with their votes. To ensure that their services are not put to waste, campaign teams will keep a list of the constituents\u2019 contact information and reach out to them prior to the election to remind them of the assistance distributed (Politik Uang di Indonesia<\/em>, Bab 1). <\/p>\n\n\n\n

While these patronage strategies do not always involve direct cash transactions between candidates and voters, looking beyond the surface of these exchanges reveals a familiar vote buying structure, which can have up to a twenty (20) to twenty five (25) percent success rate (Politik Uang di Indonesia<\/em>, Bab 13). Interestingly, a more recent survey revealed that \u201c83 percent of respondents to the figure survey considered that voters consider gifts of money, goods, or services from legislative candidates or political parties they receive when voting\u201d (UPSJ<\/a>). This practice has become so normalized that election integrity organizations glance past these exchanges, dismissing them as simply part of the campaigning process. The 2019 Charta Politika survey exposed that \u201cDapil DKI Jakarta I (East Jakarta) is the region with the highest level of acceptance of the course of money politics (58.2%),\u201d a surprising find considering Jakarta\u2019s status as the political center of Indonesia would hold higher expectations of resilience to corrupt practices (UPSJ<\/a>).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Patronage and clientelism work hand-in-hand, and are often inseparable from one another. While patronage refers to the actions candidates take to win voters\u2019 favor, clientelism encapsulates the continuous, hierarchical power structure between the politician — the \u201cpatron\u201d — and the voter — the \u201cclient\u201d (Politik Uang di Indonesia, <\/em>Bab 1). Social clientelism seeks to create reciprocal relationships between candidates and voters, and as a result, often politicizes basic human needs. Former President Joko \u201cJokowi\u201d Widodo used clientelism in January of 2024, when he visited Salatiga City, Central Java to oversee rice distribution from government reserves. His timing was particularly notable, visiting less than a month before the General Election (PRAKARSA<\/a>). <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Also relevant to the 2024 General Election is presidential candidate pair 1 with Anies Baswadan, the former DKI Jakarta governor who was elected in 2017 with promises to build the Jakarta International Stadium (JIS). The JIS was built, as promised, in 2019, with the intent to provide Persija Jakarta with a new stadium after the Lebak Bulus stadium was demolished because of the MRT project. Given that the Jakmania, supporters of the Persija Jakarta football club, is the largest football fan base in Indonesia, they are often targeted for political endeavors (Septyatna and Ghofur<\/a>). Although presidential candidate pair 1 was not elected in the 2024 election, Anies\u2019s clientelism strategies used during his time as DKI Jakarta\u2019s governor were undeniably effective. Although he was not able to run for reelection in November 2024 due to party conflicts, \u201c73 percent of National Awakening Party (PKB) voters in Jakarta said they would have voted for Anies had he been able to run, while 76 percent of Jakarta voters from the National Democratic Party (Nasdem) expressed the same sentiment\u201d (Jakarta Globe<\/a>). Although clientelism was not the only reason for his popularity, it certainly played a role.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Politik uang <\/em>has become an integral part of the Indonesian political scene. To combat this prevalent issue, the government and many LSMs have taken action to improve budget monitoring and standardizing processes vulnerable to politik uang<\/em>. While these initiatives are important steps towards solving this problem, real change is impossible without efforts from all levels of government. So, until nation-wide action is taken to stop politik uang <\/em>from corrupting Indonesian politics, it will likely continue indefinitely.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Written By<\/strong>: Leila Omran (IDEA intern staff, from Princeton University, US)<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Editor<\/strong>: Ahmad Hedar<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Sources:<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n